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INTRODUCTION 
Recent welfare reform legislation replaced the Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program 
with a largely defederalized welfare program, 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). 
Benefit generosity, enforcement of program rules, 
availability of training, and other aspects of TANF are 
expected to vary widely across states as a result of the 
defederalization. That has led to concern that some 
welfare recipients will migrate to states that have more 
generous programs. The concern is not a new one. 
Before the legislation was passed, many questioned 
whether large inter-state differences in the AFDC 
benefit paid to families induced migration. This thesis 
examines whether that was the case: did AFDC benefit 
differentials affect individuals' location choices? 
Among other things, the answer will help us better 
understand how individuals may respond to variation in 
welfare programs under TANF. 
The results of the study also have implications for 
academic research. Welfare analysts have used the 
variation in AFDC benefits across states to identify its 
effect on individuals' marital status, childbearing, and 
labor supply choices, for example. If AFDC benefits 
playa role in individuals' location choices, then the 
variation in benefits across states is endogenous and 
cannot be used to identify the effects of AFDC on other 
decisions. 
There is a substantial literature on AFDC and 
migration, but unresolved theoretical and 
methodological issues have led to mixed results in 
studies to date. This thesis builds on the existing 
literature by developing a unique theoretical framework 
of decision making and by improving on two types of 
estimation strategies. In a departure from the previous 
literature, an individual's choice of location and choice 
of whether to work and/or receive welfare are modeled 
as sequential. The sequential model allows welfare 
benefits to act as insurance against a bad wage outcome 
in a particular location. The model yields hypotheses 
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about the effect of migration in response to AFDC 
benefit differentials on employment. 
The theoretical model guides two estimation 
strategies. The first strategy uses a "location choice" 
model, in which individuals' location choices at a point 
in time are analyzed, to ascertain whether in 
equilibrium and holding all else constant, individuals 
are distributed more heavily in higher-benefit states. 
The second strategy uses a "mobility" model, in which 
individuals' decisions to move from or stay in a location 
are analyzed to determine whether changes in benefits 
over time bring about changes in location choices over 
time. 
In the next section, the sequential model of decision-
making is developed and its theoretical implications are 
discussed. In Section III, two empirical strategies are 
explained. Estimation results are summarized in 
Section IV, and Section V is the conclusion. 
THEORETICAL MODEL OF LOCATION AND 
WORKIWELFARE CHOICE 
The theoretical model encompasses two decisions. 
Individuals choose which state to reside in and they 
choose whether to work and/or receive welfare. An 
individual's location decision is made by comparing the 
utility of the initial location to the utility of each 
alternative location in the choice set. An individual 
chooses a particular location if the expected utility from 
living there, less the cost of moving there, is greater 
than the expected utility, net of moving costs, of each of 
the other locations. An individual's work/welfare 
choice is one of four alternatives: individuals can 
receive welfare, neither work nor receive welfare, only 
work, or do some combination of work and welfare. 
Individuals also decide upon work and welfare by 
maximizing utility. 
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At the end of an initial time period, individuals must 
choose a location and work/welfare decision for the 
subsequent period. Both the choice of location and the 
work/welfare choice depend in part on what wages are 
in each location. Wages are determined by individual 
characteristics and regional economic characteristics, 
but they are also determined by a random component 
which reflects a premium or discount that certain 
individuals get when working for a particular employer, 
which can be thought of as "luck." As a result, when 
individuals are consideling different locations, they 
have information about the mean wage and variance 
around the wage for each location, but they do not 
know the actual wage in each location. Wages are only 
revealed when individuals carry out job search 
activities in the chosen location. Because of the 
uncertainty in wages, individuals calculate an expected 
utility and expected probability of each work/welfare 
alternative at the time when the location decision must 
be made, but make no work/welfare decision. Thus, 
each individual first chooses a location, based on an 
expected work/welfare choice in each location, and 
then chooses a work/welfare alternative, once the 
location decision is made and calTied out. 
The sequential framework allows for a direct effect 
of benefits on individuals who later receive welfare and 
an indirect effect of benefits on individuals who later 
choose not to receive welfare. The latter may be 
thought of as an insurance effect: individuals who move 
to a state and later find employment may have been 
affected by the insurance AFDC benefits provided 
against the possibility of a poor wage draw. The 
empirical implications are twofold. First, the initial 
sample of individuals includes both individuals initially 
observed receiving welfare and those not receiving 
welfare. Both types of individuals are assumed to have 
some uncertainty about future work and welfare 
choices. Second, wages and benefits are allowed to 
affect the location choices of both those who receive 
welfare in the new location and those who work in the 
new location. 
The advantages of the sequential framework can be 
clarified by comparing it to alternative models of 
decision making. In some studies, the work/welfare 
decision is not modeled at all, but rather "receipt of 
welfare" is included as a right-hand-side variable. The 
problem with that specification is that welfare receipt is 
endogenous. Other empirical analyses have included 
only those initially observed receiving welfare in the 
sample popUlation. The exclusion of nonrecipients 
may underestimate the true effect of AFDC benefits on 
location choice. SimultaneoLls models have also been 
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implemented. These models assume individuals decide 
whether or not to receive welfare at the time the 
location decision is made despite uncertainty about 
what wages will be in different locations. The 
empirical result is that benefits are allowed to affect 
only those sample members who receive welfare in the 
chosen location. The simultaneous framework misses 
the effect of benefits on the location choices of 
individuals who consider welfare but who later choose 
not to receive it. 
One hypothesis about the effect of migration on 
employment levels is that higher AFDC benefits induce 
some individuals to leave work in lower-benefit states 
to join the welfare rolls in higher-benefit states, 
decreasing overall employment levels. The implication 
from the sequential model of location and work/welfare 
choices-that benefits may act as insurance against a 
poor wage draw in a location-suggests certain 
modifications to that hypothesis. 
Consider an individual who is deciding whether to 
move from a location A where wages are relatively low 
to a location B where wages are relatively high. 
Individuals are likely to have better information about 
the distribution of wages in the initial state A than in B 
because of information-sharing networks among 
neighbors, family, and friends, and because individuals 
may have investigated job opportunities in the local 
area in the past. Thus, the variance of wages in B is 
greater than the variance of wages in A. The higher 
variance in wages increases the individual's risk of a 
poor wage draw in B and decreases the probability that 
the individual will move to B. If benefits are relatively 
high in the high-wage state B, then benefits may 
facilitate migration to B by offsetting some of the risk 
of a bad wage draw. On the other hand, if benefits are 
relatively high in the low-wage state A, then they may 
mitigate labor-market-equilibrating migration to B. 
Thus, migration in response to benefits has the potential 
for increasing employment levels by facilitating 
movement to higher-wage states, as well as the 
potential for decreasing employment levels by 
impeding migration out of low-wage states. The effect 
of migration in response to benefits on employment is 
in part determined by the relationship between benefits 
and wages across states. 
ESTIMATION 
Location Choice Model 
Location choice studies analyze individuals' choice 
of residence at a single point in time to ascertain 
whether in equilibrium and holding all else constant 
welfare recipients are distributed more heavily in 
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higher-benefit states. Blank (1988) employs this type 
of approach. She estimates a model of individuals' 
choice of one of twelve regions controlling for the 
characteristics of each region, including the expected 
wage rate, tax rate and unemployment level, in addition 
to the AFDC benefit level. Blank finds a positive effect 
of benefits on location choice. Two important 
methodological issues in her location choice study are 
the aggregation of location choice to the regional level 
and the validity of the implicit equilibrium assumption. 
As a result of aggregation, the effect of AFDC benefits 
on location choice is underestimated to the extent that 
benefit levels affect intraregional decisions. In 
addition, variation in distances between regions, 
variation in wages within regions, and variation in 
AFDC benefit levels within regions are not captured. 
The second methodological issue concerns the implicit 
assumption in the model that individuals are in 
equilibrium at the point in time in which they are 
observed. In Blank's analysis, there is no empirical 
support for the assumption. By using cross-sectional 
data, Blank observes individuals at different points in 
their welfare-eligible years. Those who have received 
welfare for many years are more likely to be in 
equilibrium than those who have only recently become 
eligible for welfare, as they may not have had a chance 
to react, in terms of choosing where to live, to the 
circumstance that brought about eligibility. 
The first estimation strategy improves upon Blank's 
location choice analysis. One improvement is 
straightforward: I model an individual's choice of state 
rather than the aggregated choice of region, thereby 
avoiding problems of measurement error. Another 
improvement stems from innovations of the theoretical 
model. I allow for an insurance effect of benefits by 
including benefits as regressors for all sample 
members, rather than only for those who receive 
welfare in the chosen location. A third improvement is 
that I employ longitudinal data to empirically support 
the assumption in the location choice model that 
individuals are in equilibrium with respect to location. 
I assume that individuals are in disequilibrium during 
their first year of sample eligibility because they are not 
likely to have had a chance to change location in 
response to their eligibility. I then allow individuals 
five years to reach equilibrium. Thus, the sample 
consists of individuals' observations five years after 
their initial eligible observation. 
Mobility Model 
Studies of mobility analyze changes in individuals' 
location choices between two time periods, or their 
migration behavior. Clark (1990) estimates a model of 
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individuals' decisions to move or stay and includes as a 
determinant of that choice the AFDC benefit level in the 
state in which an individual is initially observed. 
Zimmerman and Levine (1995) compare the migration 
decisions of individuals eligible for AFDC to the 
migration decisions of individuals ineligible for AFDC. 
The foremost problem in these and other mobility 
studies is the endogeneity of the AFDC benefit level in 
the initial location-the benefit level is endogenous 
because individuals have chosen the location in which 
they are observed in time periods before observation. 
Thus, these studies may underestimate the effect of 
benefits on migration to the extent that migration in 
response to benefits occurred before observation. 
In a second estimation strategy, I improve upon 
previous mobility studies. Two contributions are 
noteworthy. First, I deal with the problem of 
endogenous benefits by analyzing changes in location 
as a function of changes in covariates, which are 
exogenous, instead of levels, which are endogenous. 
Second, I parameterize individuals' choices with a 
dependent variable indicating which state the individual 
chose and a lagged independent variable indicating 
location in the initial time period. Previous mobility 
studies have parameterized individuals' choices as the 
dichotomous "move" or "stay" decision. The move/ 
stay decision must be estimated with either probit or 
logit models, which are not able to incorporate controls 
for characteristics of all alternative locations. The 
model I employ can be estimated with a conditional 
logit model that readily incorporates characteristics of 
all locations. 
The specification of right-hand-side variables in 
changes requires that individuals be in equilibrium with 
respect to location in the initial observation and in the 
terminal observation. If individuals are in equilibrium 
in their initial location, they will only react to shifts in 
variables that affect the utility of each location, not the 
levels of these variables. The shifts induce 
disequilibrium in location, and individuals respond by 
choosing a location that is optimal under the new 
conditions. As in the location choice model, I support 
the equilibrium assumptions with a specific sample 
selection methodology involving longitudinal data. In 
this model, I assume that individuals reach equilibrium 
quickly, by the year following their first eligible year. 
For the terminal equilibrium observation, I use each 
individual's observation five years later. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In the location choice model, I find a positive but 
insignificant effect of AFDC benefits on location 
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choice. Even were the hypothesis that the AFDC effect 
is different from zero accepted, the practical effect of 
AFDC is negligible. The magnitude of the AFDC 
coefficient can be discussed in terms of its "retentive" 
and "attractive" powers, the former refening to the 
effect of an increase in benefits in the initial state on 
staying in the initial state and the latter to the effect of 
an increase in benefits in an alternative state on moving 
to the alternative state. The retentive effect is smaller 
than the attractive effect, but neither effect is large. A 
$100 per month increase in AFDC benefits on average 
increases the probability of staying in the same location 
less than 1 %. The retentive effect is small because the 
probability of staying is large to begin with-the mean 
probability of staying was 91 %. The probability of 
choosing a location other than the original location 
rises on average 3.8% from a $100 change inAFDC, 
while for half of the sample the average effect was 
more than 12.9%. But even an attractive effect of 13% 
is rarely enough of an effect to evoke a move, given the 
large probability of staying in the original location and 
low probabilities of choosing alternative locations. 
Thus, the effect of inertia is significantly stronger than 
the attractive effect of AFDC. In the mobility model, I 
find that changes in AFDC have a positive but 
insignificant effect on location choice, and the 
magnitude of the AFDC effect is comparable to that in 
the location choice. A $100 increase in AFDC in a state 
other than the initial state increases the probability of 
choosing that location 2.6% on average. 
What explains the absence of a strong positive and 
significant AFDC effect? Factors that limit individuals' 
ability to migrate and factors that limit migration given 
an ability to migrate are at work. One of the factors that 
limits mobility is liquidity constraints. Money to 
finance a move may not be readily available. 
Estimation results indicate that this may be the case: the 
effects on the probability of choosing a location other 
than the initial location of distance and number of 
children, which increase the monetary cost of a move, 
are negative and significant. Another monetary cost not 
captured in the model is that of switching from 
receiving welfare in one state to receiving welfare in 
another. Bureaucratic delays may result in a lag 
between receipt of the last check from the initial state 
and receipt of the first check in the new state. 
Liquidity-constrained individuals may not be able to 
afford the time without income. Another factor that 
limits mobility is the network of familial and other 
support that low-income parents develop in their initial 
state. The presence of non-famil y members in the 
household and the proxy for familial ties in a state, 
"state in which one grew up," both have large and 
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significant negative effects on the probability of a 
move. Others in the household and family members 
may provide services which would be lost in the event 
of a move. Low levels of education are also a migration 
deterrent. Most AFDC eligible or nearly eligible 
individuals have less than a high school education. 
Even without controlling for income, mobility is 
limited among less educated individuals. Education 
likely increases the ability of workers to gct placed in 
jobs, either because they are more employable or 
because they have better information about 
opportunities, leaving less educated individuals at a 
disadvantage in new markets. 
Why mightAFDC differentials not affect migration, 
given an ability to migrate? One consideration is 
information. Individuals may not know the differing 
benefit levels across states. Within-community 
information networks are strong, but it is not clear that 
information about benefits across the nation is easily 
and readily accessible. A second issue involves 
multiperiod optimization and thus is not captured 
explicitly in estimation of the two-period model used in 
this paper. In a multiperiod model, individuals have a 
longer time horizon to consider, and decisions are made 
in the first time period considering the effect of that 
decision on all future time periods. Thus, an individual 
thinking about whether or not to move to a new location 
considers the one time cost of moving compared to the 
benefits of moving that extend over all future years in 
which the individuals lives in the new location. The 
shorter the time over which the benefits accrue, the less 
likely a move will be. (Indeed, the effect of age on the 
probability of migration is negative.) Consider the fact 
that for many individuals the duration of AFDC 
recipiency is relatively short: Blank (1989) finds a 
median spell length of between 19 and 22 months, 
while Ellwood (1986) notes that about 47% of new 
spells last less than two years. The value of moving to 
a state with higher AFDC payments will be smaller the 
shorter is the time period over which individuals expect 
to receive payments. Multiperiod optimization also 
involves individuals' expectations about future values 
of wages, benefits and the lilee. If individuals are aware 
that AFDC benefits in higher-payment states have been 
falling more rapidly over time than in lower-payment 
states and they expect that trend to continue, then their 
perceived long run value of moving for higher benefits 
decreases. 
CONCLUSION 
Estimation of individuals' choices of location and 
individuals' decisions to change location yields 
consistent results. Benefit differentials across states do 
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not appear to shift the equilibrium distribution of 
individuals toward higher-benefit states and changes in 
AFDC over time do not significantly affect individuals' 
decisions to change locations, 
What are the implications of the findings? Recall 
that the issue is a concern in welfare research where the 
variation in benefits is used to identify other incentive 
effects of AFDC. The results are heartening for 
academic research as they indicate that the variation in 
AFDC benefits over states can be considered 
exogenous at least with regard to individuals' location 
decisions, 
The results also help in our understanding of how 
individuals are likely to react to variation in welfare 
across states under TANF. Given the lack of response 
in terms of migration to large AFDC benefit 
differentials, we expect that migration in response to 
TANF differentials will be limited, with the caveat that 
individuals may react differently to variation in time 
limits or work requirements than they do to differences 
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monthly monetary payments. Continued research is 
necessary to more fully address the issue. The models 
presented here provide a useful framework for future 
research on differences in TANF programs and 
migration, 
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